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Abstract
We study the problem of finding equilibrium strategies in multi-agent games with incomplete
payoff information, where the payoff matrices are only known to the players up to some bounded
uncertainty sets. In such games, an ex-post equilibrium characterizes equilibrium strategies that
are robust to the payoff uncertainty. When the game is one-shot, we show that in zero-sum
polymatrix games, an ex-post equilibrium can be computed efficiently using linear programming.
We further extend the notion of ex-post equilibrium to stochastic games, where the game is
played repeatedly in a sequence of stages and the transition dynamics are governed by an Markov
decision process (MDP). We provide sufficient condition for the existence of an ex-post Markov
perfect equilibrium (MPE). We show that under bounded payoff uncertainty, the value of any
two-player zero-sum stochastic game can be computed up to a tight value interval using dynamic
programming.
1 Introduction
The problem of certifying the existence of equilibria of multi-agent games has been a focal point
in the game theory literature. In particular, seminal work has resulted in algorithms that find
equilibrium strategies efficiently when all parameters of the game are known to the players (a.k.a.,
games of complete information) [14, 19].
In practice, the parameters of the game are often only known partially by the players. This presents
a core problem: how can we find equilibria in games in a way that is robust to uncertainty in the
game parameters? The problem of finding robust solutions to multi-player games is a difficult area
with many open questions, starting with even the most fundamental problem of defining robustness
in games.
In this work, we focus on multi-agent games with payoff uncertainty. We consider both one-shot
zero-sum games and stochastic games [19], where the game dynamics are driven by a Markov decision
process (MDP). We assume that the payoffs live in a bounded uncertainty set, with no further
assumptions on the distribution of the payoffs. We focus on the ex-post equilibrium, which is a
common distribution-free concept first introduced in auction theory [4, 8]. The ex-post equilibrium
is a strict notion of equilibrium, where each player’s strategy is a best response to the other players’
strategies, under all possible realizations of the uncertain payoffs.
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In one-shot games, we consider finite, simultaneous-move games. In such a game, there are a finite
number of players who each may take a finite number of actions. The player chooses their actions
simultaneously, in the absence of knowledge of the actions chosen by the other players. In fact,
although Nash equilibria always exist in such a game, even with complete information, finding Nash
equilibria for general-sum finite games can be intractable [5]. Therefore, we restrict to a smaller
classes of finite games: zero-sum polymatrix games. In such games of complete information, a Nash
equilibrium can be found efficiently using linear programming [2].
We extend the idea of ex-post equilibria to stochastic multi-agent games [19]. We consider the infinite
discounted setting, where the game is played repeatedly for an infinite number of stages, and the
transition dynamics among stages are captured by an MDP. The goal of each player is to maximize
the discounted expected payoff. A Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE) refers to a perfect equilibrium
where the players’ strategies depend only on the current stage. Under complete information about
the stage payoffs and the MDP, Shapley [19] showed that an MPE can be found using dynamic
programming. We consider payoff uncertainty in stochastic games. Specifically, we assume that at
each stage, the payoffs live in some bounded uncertainty set.
Contributions:
1. We show that for zero-sum polymatrix games with bounded payoff uncertainty sets, an ex-post
equilibrium can be found efficiently using linear programming. This is different from the
work of Aghassi and Bertsimas [1], who work with a weaker notion of robust equilibrium in
general-sum finite games, one that does not yield efficiency guarantees.
2. We extend the notion of ex-post equilibrium to multi-agent stochastic games with payoff
uncertainties; i.e., we define a notion of ex-post MPE. We provide sufficient conditions for the
existence of such an equilibrium, and show that the feasible values of any two-player zero-sum
stochastic game can be bounded in a tight interval using dynamic programming.
2 Related Work
Payoff uncertainty in one-shot games: Multiple techniques have emerged for handling games
with incomplete information in one-shot games. Harsanyi [7] first extended Nash’s result to games
with incomplete information by assuming that the payoffs are drawn from a probability distribution
known to all players, and introduced the concept of a Bayesian equilibrium.
While Harsanyi [7]’s method assumes complete common knowledge only of the distribution of the
payoffs, this assumption may still be too strong in practice. Aghassi and Bertsimas [1] consider
the case when the distribution of the payoffs is unknown, but the payoffs are drawn from a
bounded uncertainty set. They describe two “distribution free” concepts of equilibrium: the ex-post
equilibrium and the robust-optimization equilibrium, where the robust-optimization equilibrium
is a less restrictive notion that is guaranteed to exist. They give a gradient-based algorithm to
approximately find a robust-optimization equilibrium for a general-sum finite game when the payoff
comes from a polyhedral uncertainty set. However, their algorithm does not come with complexity
or optimality guarantees. Games with payoff uncertainties have also been explored in applications in
operational research, multi-agent system and controls [6, 13, 16, 17, 20].
Stochastic games: Many real-world systems can be modeled as multi-agent systems and are
dynamical in nature. There has been extensive study on stochastic games in various fields including
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economics, mathematics and operation research, etc [3, 12, 15, 19]. Stochastic games are also closely
related to the literature on reinforcement learning (RL). In a classic RL setting, MDPs are used to
model a single agent’s interaction with the environment. In stochastic games, the MDP is generalized
to a repeated game setting where multiple agents simultaneously interact with the environment.
Various types of incomplete information have been considered in repeated games. Kiekintveld
et al. [11], Sastry et al. [18] consider stochastic payoffs, where the payoffs are drawn from unknown
distributions. Kardeş et al. [9] consider N-player discounted stochastic games where both the
transition probabilities and payoffs of the game uncertain and bounded in some uncertainty set. They
show the existence of a robust-optimization equilibrium and propose an mathematical programming
formulation to compute it. However, the robust-optimization equilibrium is a weaker notion than
the ex-post equilibrium, and their algorithm is not guaranteed to find an ex-post MPE.
3 Ex-post Equilibrium in Polymatrix Games
3.1 Polymatrix games
An N -player zero-sum polymatrix game [2] can be informally expressed as a graph, where each node
represents a player, and each edge represents a two-player game between two nodes. The payoff for a
given player is the sum of the player’s payoffs from each game on an edge connected to the player’s
node. The N -player polymatrix game is zero-sum if the sum of the total payoffs for all players is
zero.
Formally, an N -player polymatrix game [2] consists of the following:
• A finite set [N ] = {1, ..., N} of players (nodes), and a finite set E of edges, which consists of
unordered pairs [i, j] of players, i 6= j, i ∈ [N ], j ∈ [N ].
• For each player i ∈ [N ], a finite set of actions [di] = {1, ..., di}.
• A mixed strategy for player i is defined by a vector in the simplex xi ∈ ∆di , where ∆di = {x ∈
Rdi : xT1 = 1, x ≥ 0}. Each entry of xi is the probability that player 1 plays action i. When
there exists one entry of xi that is equal to one, xi is a pure strategy.
• For each edge [i, j] ∈ E, a two-player general-sum game with payoff matrices Aij ∈ Rdi×dj , Aji ∈
Rdj×di . If player i chooses k ∈ [di] and player j chooses action l ∈ [dj ], then Aijkl is the payoff
for player i and Ajilk is the payoff for player j in the two-player game. Note that the player
chooses one strategy and plays it in all pairwise games with other players.
For each player i ∈ [N ] and a strategy profile for all players (x1, ..., xN ), the total payoff for player i
is the sum of the payoffs over adjacent edges:
pi(x
1, ..., xN ) =
∑
j:j∈[N ],[i,j]∈E
(xi)TAijxj .
Note that for a fixed i, the summation of the payoffs is taken over all edges in E that include the
player i (and not the summation over the full set of edges in E).
Now we are ready to define a zero-sum polymatrix game.
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Definition 1. (Zero-sum polymatrix game) An N -player polymatrix game is zero-sum if for all
pure strategy profiles (x1, ..., xN ), the sum of the total payoffs for all players is zero:
N∑
i=1
pi(x
1, ..., xN ) = 0.
A zero-sum polymatrix game is a more general game than a two-player zero-sum game. With
complete information about the payoff matrices and finite action space, a Nash equilibrium exists
for any zero-sum polymatrix game, and can be found efficiently using linear programming [2]. We
provide further definitions of the Nash equilibrium for polymatrix games and two-player zero-sum
games in Appendix A.
3.2 Solving ex-post equilibrium in polymatrix games
A Nash equilibrium is well-defined in polymatrix games when the payoff matrices are fully known.
However, when the payoffs are uncertain, we need a more generalized notion of equilibrium to handle
the uncertainty. An ex-post equilibrium describes a “distribution-free" equilibrium that is robust to
the payoff uncertainties [1, 4, 8]. The idea is that for all feasible payoffs, no player has the incentive
to change the strategy on their own.
Definition 2. (Ex-post equilibrium for N -player polymatrix game) A mixed strategy profile
(x1∗, ..., xN∗) is an ex-post equilibrium for an N -player polymatrix game with uncertainty sets
U ij (Aij ∈ U ij for all i, j ∈ {1, ..., N}) if for each player i ∈ {1, ..., N}, we have
xi∗ ∈ arg max
xi∈∆di
∑
[i,j]∈E
(xi)TAijxj∗ ∀Aij ∈ U ij .
Since ex-post equilibrium is a restrictive notion of equilibrium, it is not guaranteed to always exist
[1]. However, when it exists, the ex-post equilibrium defines a powerful set of equilibrium strategies
which are robust to payoff uncertainties. In a two-player zero-sum game, an ex-post equilibrium also
allows us to conveniently locate the value of the game given the uncertainty set. Given an ex-post
equilibrium (x∗, y∗), for any feasible payoff A ∈ U , the value of the game is simply contained in the
set {(x∗)>A(y∗)> : A ∈ U}.
We show in Theorem 1 that any existing ex-post equilibrium can be found exactly for an N -player
zero-sum polymatrix game using linear programming.
To build the linear programming representation for Theorem 1, we adapt an idea due to Cai et al.
[2] to characterize the payoffs of a zero-sum polymatrix game using a square matrix R as follows:
R ∈ R
∑N
i=1 di×
∑N
i=1 di . The rows of R are indexed by (player: action) pairs (i : ai) for i ∈ [N ],
ai ∈ [di]. The columns of R are indexed in the same way. The entry R(i:ai),(j:aj) = Aijaiaj if [i, j] ∈ E.
Therefore, R characterizes the full payoff information of the game (see Appendix B for a visual
schematic of R).
We consider the uncertainty set as the convex hull of known payoff matrices: R ∈ conv{R1, ...RK}.
This is equivalent to having each pairwise payoff matrix be in a convex hull of matrices. For each
Ri where i ∈ [K], the corresponding game is zero-sum as defined in Definition 1. The robust LP
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formulation for the multi-player zero-sum polymatrix game is as follows:
min
x,w
K∑
l=1
N∑
i=1
wli
s.t. wli ≥ eTaiRlx ∀i ∈ [N ], ai ∈ [di], l ∈ [K]
x ∈ ∆,
(1)
where x ∈ R
∑
i∈[N ] di is the vector which represents the strategy profile for all players, concatenating
xi, i ∈ [N ]. The strategy for each player i is in the probability simplex: xi ∈ ∆di . We use
eai ∈ R
∑
i∈[N ] di to represent a one-hot vector, where player i playing a single action ai with
probability 1, and all other entries of eai are zero.
Theorem 1 (Proof in Appendix C). Any ex-post equilibrium of the zero-sum polymatrix game with
uncertainty set U = conv{R1, R2, ...RK} is an optimal solution of the LP problem (1). Conversely,
any optimal solution for the LP problem (1) is an ex-post equilibrium of the game.
We provide further discussion on the existence of ex-post equilibrium and characterize the maximal
uncertainty sets for an ex-post equilibrium to exist in Appendix E.
4 Stochastic Games with Payoff Uncertainty
We extend the discussion on payoff uncertainties to discounted stochastic games with infinite horizon.
We further extend the notion of ex-post equilibrium to ex-post MPE in such games. We provide
sufficient conditions for the existence of such ex-post MPE, and show that the feasible value of any
two-player zero-sum stochastic games with payoff uncertainties can be located up to a value interval
using dynamic programming.
A stochastic game [19] with N players is defined as follows. Denote S as the stage space, and Xi(s)
as the set of actions that are available to player i in stage s. We consider finite stage and action
spaces. For each stage s, define the stage action profile to be an element of the product space of
action sets available to all players i in stage s: x ∈ ΠiXi(s). Denote by Mi(x, s) the stage payoff
for player i, and let P(s′|s,x) denote the transition probability which is a distribution on the stage
space S.
The game starts in an initial stage s0. At each stage t, all players simultaneously choose their actions
according to their strategies, the stage payoffs are realized, and the game transitions to the next
stage according to the transition probability. Let H denote the histories of past actions and stages.
Let xi(s,H) ∈ Xi denotes the action of player i at stage s, which is dependent on the histories and
the current stage. Note that xi can be random, which corresponds to mixed strategies.
Given x1, · · · , xN , the expected discounted payoff for player i starting from stage s0 is:
Πi(x1, · · · , xN ; s0)
= E
[
Σ∞t=0γ
tMi(x1(s
t,Ht), · · · , xN (st,Ht); st)
]
,
where γ ∈ (0, 1) is the discount factor, and the expectation is taken over the randomness in the stage
transitions and the possibly mixed strategies.
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4.1 Ex-post MPE
We consider stochastic games with uncertain payoffs, where for every stage s ∈ S and player i, the
stage game is a polymatrix game. The stage payoff for player i isMi(x, s) = Σj∈[N ],j 6=ixi(s)Aij(s)xj(s),
where Aij(s) is in an uncertainty set U ij(s).
An MPE refers to a perfect equilibrium where players’ strategies depend only on the current stage
but not the histories (i.e., Markov strategies), in a stochastic game when the payoffs are fully known.
We denote these strategies as xi(s). We generalize the notion of ex-post equilibrium to MPE.
Definition 3. Given a stochastic game with N players, finite stage space S, and uncertain payoffs
Aij(s) ∈ U ij(s),∀s ∈ S,∀i, j ∈ [N ], a set of strategies (x∗1(s), · · · , x∗N (s)) is an ex-post MPE if and
only if ∀i, j ∈ [N ],∀s ∈ S,∀Aij(s) ∈ U ij(s), (x∗1(s), · · · , x∗N (s)) maximizes the expected discounted
payoff for all the players.
We provide sufficient conditions for the existence of an ex-post MPE of any N -player game with
finite stage space and action space by reducing the game to a one-shot finite game.
For each player i and stage s, we create an “agent” player (i, s) with action a(i, s) ∈ Xi(s). We
denote the action profile of all the agent as a = (a(1, s), · · · , a(N, s), s ∈ S). The payoff to agent
(i, s) is as follows: Qi,s(a) = E
[
Σ∞t=0γtMi(a(1, st), · · · , a(N, st); st)|s0 = s
]
.
Theorem 2 (Proof in Appendix C). Given that the agent game has an ex-post equilibrium
(a∗(i, s), i ∈ [N ], s ∈ S), and defining the strategy for each player i in stage s ∈ S as x∗i (s) = a∗(i, s),
then (x∗i (s), i ∈ [N ], x ∈ S) is an ex-post MPE for the stochastic game.
Note that the agent game is not a polymatrix game due to the stage transitions. Therefore its
ex-post equilibrium (when it exists) can not be found using LP(1). Solving for ex-post equilibria for
multi-player game with more general payoff structures is a topic for future research.
4.2 Value interval
When the stage payoffs are fully known, and the games has two players, Shapley [19] shows that all
two-player, zero-sum stochastic games have a unique value, which can be obtained at an MPE.
Due to the uncertainty in the payoffs, the value of a two-player, zero-sum stochastic game can not
be determined fully unless we have access to the complete payoff information. Instead, we show that
such game has a value interval where, given any feasible payoffs in the uncertainty set, the value
of the full-information game must be in this interval. Further, the interval can be determined by
dynamic programming.
Theorem 3. (Proof in Appendix D.) For any two-player, zero-sum stochastic game with finite
stage space S and actions space X (s),Y(s),∀s ∈ S, let x(s)>A(s)y(s) denote the stage payoff for
player x in stage s, −x(s)>A(s)y(s) the stage payoff for player y in stage s, and the uncertain payoff
A(s) ∈ U(s) = conv({A1(s), · · · , Ak(s)(s)}), ∀s ∈ S. Such a game has a value interval I, where
∀A(s) ∈ U(s), ∀s ∈ S, the value of the full-information game with payoff matrices A(s) must lie in
I. Further, I can be found by dynamic programming.
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5 Discussion
There are several limitations to our work. First, we do not have necessary conditions for the existence
of ex-post equilibria. Our current proof techniques for finding ex-post equilibria rely on bounded
polyhedral uncertainty sets and are limited to polymatrix payoffs. In the context of polymatrix
games the conditions for ex-post equilibrium are often formulated as optimization problems that
use the extremal points of the uncertainty set. For other convex sets, such as norm balls, one could
potentially construct a polyhedral outer approximation. An important area of future research is
to adapt iterative algorithms to find approximate solutions for games with more general payoff
structures and uncertainty sets.
Our extensions to stochastic games show that a sufficient condition for existence of ex-post MPE in
terms of existence of ex-post equilibrium for the agent game. We leave for future work to determine
the necessary conditions for the existence of ex-post MPE. Considering payoff uncertainties at every
stage can encode problems of practical relevance to RL such as the use of proxy rewards. Another
interesting extension is to consider uncertainty around transition probabilities, which relates to
mis-specified MDP problems.
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A Definitions for Nash Equilibrium, Two-player Zero-sum Games
A.1 Nash equilibrium for N-player polymatrix games
Under complete information, a set of strategies is a Nash equilibrium if each player has no incentive
to unilaterally change their strategy given the strategies of all other players. Nash’s seminal result
shows that for every finite simultaneous-move game, a Nash equilibrium of mixed strategies exists
[14].
Formally, a Nash equilibrium for the N-player zero-sum polymatrix game is defined as follows:
Definition 4. (Nash equilibrium for N-player polymatrix game [10]) A mixed strategy profile
(x1∗, ..., xN∗) is a Nash equilibrium for an N-player polymatrix game if for each player i ∈ {1, ..., N}
and each mixed strategy xi ∈ ∆mi , we have
pi(x
1∗, ..., xi∗, ..., xN∗) ≥ pi(x1∗, ..., xi, ..., xN∗)
Equivalently, for all i ∈ {1, ..., N},
xi∗ ∈ arg max
xi∈∆di
∑
[i,j]∈E
(xi)TAijxj∗
Cai et al. [2] show that for zero-sum polymatrix games with finite action space, Nash equilibria can
be found efficiently using linear programming.
A.2 Two-player zero-sum finite games
Two-player zero-sum finite games can be defined as follows: suppose Player 1 has n actions to choose
from, and Player 2 has m actions to choose from. The payoffs for each player can be represented by
a payoff matrix A ∈ Rn×m: if Player 1 plays action i and Player 2 plays action j, then Aij is the
payoff for Player 1 and −Aij is the payoff for Player 2.
A mixed strategy for Player 1 is defined by a vector in the simplex x ∈ ∆n, where ∆n = {x ∈ Rn :
xT1 = 1, x ≥ 0}. Each entry xi is the probability that Player 1 plays action i. A similar mixed
strategy vector y ∈ ∆m can be defined for Player 2. If Player 1 chooses mixed strategy x and Player
2 chooses mixed strategy y, then the expected payoff for Player 1 is xTAy and the expected payoff for
Player 2 is xT (−A)y. Each player simultaneously and independently chooses a strategy to maximize
their expected payoff.
A Nash equilibrium for the two-player zero-sum game is defined as follows:
Definition 5. (Nash equilibrium for two-player zero-sum game [10]) A pair of strategies (x∗, y∗) is
a Nash equilibrium in a two-player zero-sum game with payoff matrix A if
x∗ ∈ arg max
x∈∆n
xTAy∗, y∗ ∈ arg max
y∈∆m
(x∗)T (−A)y
or equivalently,
min
y∈∆m
(x∗)TAy = (x∗)TAy∗ = max
x∈∆n
xTAy∗
Definition 5 shows that the Nash equilibrium strategies x∗ and y∗ are best response strategies to
each other: given that Player 2 plays with strategy y∗, the strategy x∗ maximizes Player 1’s expected
payoff. Likewise, given that Player 1 plays with strategy x∗, the strategy y∗ maximizes Player 2’s
expected payoff.
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C Proofs for Section 3
Theorem 1 (Proof in Appendix C). Any ex-post equilibrium of the zero-sum polymatrix game with
uncertainty set U = conv{R1, R2, ...RK} is an optimal solution of the LP problem (1). Conversely,
any optimal solution for the LP problem (1) is an ex-post equilibrium of the game.
Any ex-post equilibrium of the zero-sum polymatrix game with uncertainty sets U = conv{R1, R2, ...RK}
is an optimal solution of the LP problem (1). Conversely, any optimal solution for the LP problem
(1) is an ex-post equilibrium of the game.
We prove the above theorem through the following two lemmas, where in lemma 1 we consider
U = {R1, R2, ...RK}, and in lemma 2 we generalize the result to U = conv{R1, R2, ...RK}
Lemma 1. Any ex-post equilibrium of the zero-sum polymatrix game with uncertainty sets U =
{R1, R2, ...RK} is an optimal solution of the LP problem (1). Conversely, any optimal solution for
the LP problem (1) is an ex-post equilibrium of the game.
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Proof. Consider any feasible solution x,w:
K∑
l=1
N∑
i=1
wli ≥
K∑
l=1
N∑
i=1
max
ai
eTaiRlx
=
K∑
l=1
N∑
i=1
max
yi∈∆˜di
(yi)TRlx
≥
K∑
l=1
N∑
i=1
(xi)TRlx
= 0
(2)
where yi ∈ R
∑
i∈N di is a vector where the sub-vector y[i] ∈ ∆di , and all other entries are zero; xi is
the vector generated from x, where the sub-vector x[i] is kept the same as x and all other entries
are zero. The first step comes from the fact that x,w is feasible; the second step comes from the
fact that the objective is linear in eai ; the last step follows since for every Ri, i ∈ [K], the game is
zero-sum.
Consider an ex-post equilibrium x∗: the second inequality in (2) becomes equality by the definition
of the ex-post equilibrium. By setting (wli)
∗ = ((x∗)i)TRlx∗, ∀i ∈ [N ], l ∈ [K], the first inequality in
(2) becomes equality. Therefore,
∑K
l=1
∑N
i=1(w
l
i)
∗ = 0, which means (x∗, w∗) is an optimal solution
to the LP.
Consider an optimal solution (x∗, w∗) to the LP problem (1), if the game has an ex-post equilibrium,
then the objective function of the optimal solution is zero. Therefore, the second inequality in (2)
becomes equality. Therefore, x∗ is an ex-post equilibrium.
Next, we generalize the result to the larger uncertainty set U = conv{R1, R2, ...RK}.
Lemma 2. Any ex-post solution to the N-player zero-sum polymatrix game with uncertainty set
U = {R1, R2, ...RK} is an ex-post equilibrium for the N-player zero-sum polymatrix game with
uncertainty set U = conv{R1, R2, ...RK}.
Proof. Denote the game with U = {R1, R2, ...RK} as Game (I), and the game with U = conv{R1, R2, ...RK}
as Game (II). Consider an ex-post equilibrium x for Game (I). Then by the definition of the ex-post
equilibrium, ∀i ∈ [N ], ∀l ∈ [K]
xi ∈ arg max
yi∈∆˜di
(yi)TRlx
Consider R =
∑K
l=1 zlRl where z ∈ ∆k. We have that
arg max
yi∈∆˜di
(yi)T
(
K∑
l=1
zlRl
)
x = arg max
yi∈∆˜di
K∑
l=1
zl
(
(yi)TRlx
)
it follows that:
x ∈ arg max
yi∈∆˜di
K∑
l=1
zl
(
(yi)TRlx
)
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Therefore:
x ∈ arg max
yi∈∆˜di
(yi)T
(
K∑
l=1
zlRl
)
x
Hence, x is an ex-post equilibrium.
D Proofs for Section 4
In this appendix, we provide proof details for results on stochastic games.
Theorem 2 (Proof in Appendix C). Given that the agent game has an ex-post equilibrium
(a∗(i, s), i ∈ [N ], s ∈ S), and defining the strategy for each player i in stage s ∈ S as x∗i (s) = a∗(i, s),
then (x∗i (s), i ∈ [N ], x ∈ S) is an ex-post MPE for the stochastic game.
Given the agent game has an ex-post equilibrium (a∗(i, s), i ∈ [N ], s ∈ S), define the strategy for
each player i in stage s ∈ S as x∗i (s) = a∗(i, s), then (x∗i (s), i ∈ [N ], x ∈ S) is an ex-post MPE for
the stochastic game.
Proof. Note that the agent game has finitely many players and actions. For each agent (i, s), the
payoff Qi,s(x) lies in an uncertainty set defined as
Gi,s =
{
Qi,s(x) : Qi,s(x) = E
[
Σ∞t=0Σj∈[N ],j 6=iγ
txi(s)A
ij(s)xj(s)|s0 = s
]
, Aij(s) ∈ U ij(s)
}
Given this finite agent game has an ex-post equilibrium a∗ = (a∗(i, s), i ∈ [N ], a ∈ S), define the
strategy for each player i in stage s ∈ S as x∗i (s) = a∗(i, s). By the definition of ex-post equilibrium,
a∗(i, s) = argmax
a(i,s)
Qi,s(a(i, s),a∗ \ (i, s)), ∀Qi,s ∈ Gi,s
⇐⇒ x∗i (s) = argmax
xi(s)
Πi(xi(s),x∗−i(s); s), ∀Aij(s) ∈ U ij(s), i, j ∈ [N ]
where we denote x∗−i(s) as the set of strategies x
∗
i (s) for the players except player i. Obviously x
∗
i (s)
only depends on the current stage. Given x∗−i(s), x
∗
i (s) maximizes the expected discounted payoff of
player i among all Markov strategies. Since for ∀Aij(s) ∈ U ij(s), i, j ∈ [N ], if all other players except
player i are playing a Markov strategy, player i has a best response in stage s which is a Markov
strategy (by identifying argmaxxi∈Xi(s) Πi(xi,x−i(s); s)), we conclude that (x
∗
i (s), i ∈ [N ], x ∈ S) is
an ex-post MPE for the stochastic game.
Theorem 4. For any two-player, zero-sum stochastic game with finite stage space S and ac-
tions space X (s),Y(s),∀s ∈ S, denote x(s)>A(s)y(s) the stage payoff for player x in stage s,
−x(s)>A(s)y(s) the stage payoff for player y in stage s, and the uncertain payoff A(s) ∈ U(s) =
conv({A1(s), · · · , Ak(s)(s)}), ∀s ∈ S. Such a game has a value interval I, where ∀A(s) ∈ U(s), ∀s ∈
S, the value of the full-information game with payoff matrices A(s), ∀s ∈ S must be in I. Further,
I can be computed by dynamic programming.
Proof. We prove by value iteration. Denote γ ∈ (0, 1) as the discount factor and P(s′|s, x, y) as
the transition probability. First, we pick arbitrary functions α : S → R, β : S → R such that
α(s) > β(s),∀s ∈ S. For each s ∈ S, define matrix Mα(s), Mβ(s) as: ∀x ∈ X (s), y ∈ Y(s),
Mα(s)(x, y) = x
>A(s)y + γΣs′∈SP(s′|s, x, y)α(s′)
Mβ(s)(x, y) = x
>A(s)y + γΣs∈SP(s′|s, x, y)β(s′)
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Since A(s) ∈ U(s) = conv({A1(s), · · · , Ak(s)(s)}), x>A(s)y ∈ [λ(x, y, s), δ(x, y, s)], where we use
λ(x, y, s) and δ(x, y, s) to denote the lower and upper bound of x>A(s)y, given x, y and A(s) ∈ U(s).
For each stage s, consider the two-player zero-sum finite game with payoff matrix
Mα(s)(x, y) = δ(x, y, s) + γΣs′∈SP(s′|s, x, y)α(s′)
x ∈ X (s), y ∈ Y(s). Since X (s),Y(s) are finite, this game has a value. Denote operator T as
(Tα)(s) = val(Mα(s)). Given α and α′,
||Tα− Tα′||∞
= max
s∈S
|Tα(s)− Tα′(s)|
= max
s∈S
|val(Mα(s))− val(Mα′(s))|
≤ max
s∈S
max
x,y
γ|Σs′∈SP(s′|s, x, y)α(s′)− Σs′∈SP(s′|s, x, y)α′(s′)|
= γmax
s∈S
|α(s)− α′(s)|
= γ||α− α′||∞
Since γ ∈ (0, 1), T is a contraction. Thus, αk = (Tαk−1) converges to a unique limit α∗ : α∗ = Tα∗
as k →∞. Similarly, define the two-player zero-sum finite game with payoff matrix
Mβ(s)(x, y) = λ(x, y, s) + γΣs′∈SP(s′|s, x, y)β(s′)
x ∈ X (s), y ∈ Y(s), and operator (Jβ)(s) = val(Jβ(s)). By a similar argument, βk = (Jβk−1)
converges to a unique limit β∗ : β∗ = Jβ∗ as k →∞. Notice that by construction, Mα(s)(x, y) >
Mβ(s)(x, y), ∀s ∈ S, ∀x ∈ X (s), y ∈ Y(s), which is preserved by the value iteration: M (Tα(s))(x, y) >
M (Jβ(s))(x, y), ∀s ∈ S,∀x ∈ X (s), y ∈ Y(s). Therefore, α∗(s) ≥ β∗(s), ∀s ∈ S.
For any feasible true payoffs {A(s), A(s) ∈ U(s),∀s ∈ S}, by construction we have Mβ(s)(x, y) ≤
Mα(s)(x, y) ≤Mα(s)(x, y),∀s ∈ S. Doing value iteration on α with the true payoffs yields the value
of the game α∗true with full payoff information {A(s), A(s) ∈ U(s), ∀s ∈ S}. Since the monotonicity
is preserved by value iteration, we have α∗true(s) ∈ I(s), ∀s ∈ S, where I(s) = [β∗(s), α∗(s)].
E Further Discussions on Maximal Uncertainty Set for Ex-post
Equilibrium
Beyond finding ex-post equilibria for a given uncertainty set, we provide characterizations of the
maximal uncertainty sets for a given Nash equilibrium strategy profile. We define the maximal
uncertainty set to be the largest set of payoffs for which the given strategy profile stays at a Nash
equilibrium. For better intuition, we start with two-player zero-sum games, and then extend the
analysis to zero-sum polymatrix games.
Informally, a tuple of strategies is stable at an ex-post equilibrium if it is indifferent to the choice
of payoff. It means that when changing the payoff, the players have no incentive to unilaterally
change their strategies. A first step towards understanding when ex-post equilibrium is attainable is
describing the types of uncertainty sets that admit one. We will frame this discussion in terms of
maximal uncertainty sets corresponding to a tuple of strategies.
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Formally, given a tuple of Nash equilibrium strategies to a nominal game, we will describe a maximal
uncertainty set U such that the given strategies are at ex-post equilibrium with respect to U .
E.1 Maximal uncertainty in two-player zero-sum games
First we consider the case of a two-player zero-sum finite game. Similar to the N-player polymatrix
games, we provide the definition of an ex-post equilibrium for a two-player zero-sum finite game.
An ex-post equilibrium for a two-player zero-sum finite game as follows:
Definition 6. (ex-post equilibrium for two-player zero-sum game) A tuple of strategies (x∗, y∗) is
an ex-post equilibrium for the two-player zero-sum game with uncertainty set U if ∀A ∈ U , the
following holds:
x∗ ∈ arg max
x∈∆n
xTAy∗
y∗ ∈ arg max
y∈∆m
x∗T (−A)y
Let x∗ ∈ ∆n and y∗ ∈ ∆m be the mixed strategy Nash equilibrium of a nominal game with payoff
A ∈ Rn×m. The maximal uncertainty set is defined as follows:
Definition 7. Given a nominal zero-sum two-player game with payoff matrix A˜ and Nash equilibrium
(x∗, y∗), a set A(x∗, y∗) is the maximal uncertainty set if ∀A ∈ A(x∗, y∗):
x∗ ∈ arg max
x∈∆n
xTAy∗; and y∗ ∈ arg max
y∈∆m
(x∗)T (−A)y
and for all A /∈ A(x∗, y∗):
x∗ /∈ arg max
x∈∆n
xTAy∗; or y∗ /∈ arg max
y∈∆m
(x∗)T (−A)y
As a consequence, an uncertain two-player zero-sum finite game with payoff uncertainty U is at
ex-post equilibrium for (x∗, y∗) if and only U ⊆ A(x∗, y∗).
Lemma 3. A pair (x∗, y∗) of best-response strategies to game with payoff A˜ is best response to a
game with payoff A if (A, x∗, y∗) satisfy the following conditions:
eTi Ay
∗ = c if x∗i > 0,∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n (3)
eTi Ay
∗ ≤ c if x∗i = 0,∀i = 1, 2, . . . , n (4)
x∗
T
Aej = c if y∗j > 0,∀j = 1, 2, . . . ,m (5)
x∗
T
Aej ≥ c if y∗j = 0,∀j = 1, 2, . . . ,m (6)
Where ei, ej are the appropriate unit vector such that eTi A is the i−th row and Aej is the jth column
of A.
Proof. To show 3, assume by contradiction:
∃i, i′ s.t. x∗i > 0, x∗i′ > 0 and eTi Ay∗ > eTi′Ay∗
Player 1 is incentivized to unilaterally change the strategy to x∗∗ by transferring the probability
associated with strategy i′ to strategy i, i.e. x∗∗i = x
∗
i + x
∗
i′ , and x
∗∗
i′ = 0.
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Similarly for 4, if x∗i = 0, then ∃i′ such that xi′ > 0. Assume by contradiction that:
∃i, i′ s.t. x∗i = 0, x∗i′ > 0 and eTi Ay∗ > eTi′Ay∗ = c
Player 1 is incentivized to change the strategy to x∗∗ by swapping the probability associated with
strategy i′ to strategy i, i.e. x∗∗i = x
∗
i′ , and x
∗∗
i′ = 0. By a symmetric argument we can show 5 and 6.
The constant c is the same across all identities.
By Lemma 3 we can conclude that the maximal uncertainty set associated to a nominal zero-sum
two-player game: (x∗, y∗, A˜) is the set of matrices that satisfy 3-6.
E.2 N-player zero-sum polymatrix games
We can extend the argument in 3 to zero-sum polymatrix games. Let Aij ∈ Rdi×dj be the payoff
matrix for player i when playing against player j. Suppose we have N players with respective mixed
strategies {x1, ..., xN} where xi ∈ ∆di , ∀i ∈ [N ]. The strategy xi chosen by player i is used across
all the pairwise games that i participates in. Let E be the adjacency set. The payoff of player i is
the sum of payoffs in all the games as defined as in 1:
pi(x) =
∑
[i,j]∈E
xiAijxj
When there is no uncertainty in the payoff matrices, a tuple of strategies {x1∗, ..., xN∗} is at Nash
equilibrium if the following holds:
xi∗ ∈ arg max
xi∈∆di
p(x1∗, . . . , xi, . . . xN∗) ∀i ∈ 1, 2, . . . N
We define the maximal uncertainty set in a polymatrix game as follows:
Definition 8. Given a nominal polymatrix games with N players, adjacency set E and Nash
equilibrium strategy tuple X∗ = (x1∗, x2∗, . . . , xN∗), the maximal uncertainty set for the game is the
product set: A(X∗) = A1,2(X∗)×A2,1(X∗)× . . .×AN,N−1(X∗) is the maximal set that satisfies
the following:
xi∗ ∈ arg max
xi∈∆di
∑
[i,j]∈E
xiAijxj∗; ∀i,∀Aij ∈ Aij
As a consequence, an uncertain polymatrix game with payoff uncertainty U = U1,2 × . . .× UN,N−1
admits ex-post equilibrium iff U ⊆ A(X∗) (i.e. ∀i 6= j,U i,j ⊆ Ai,j(X∗)).
Lemma 4. A tuple (x1∗, . . . , xN∗) is best response to a polymatrix game with payoffs A˜ij if the
following conditions are satisfied for each player:
eTk
∑
[i,j]∈E
Aijxj∗ = ci, if xi∗k > 0, ∀k = 1, 2, . . . , di (7)
eTk
∑
[i,j]∈E
Aijxj∗ ≤ ci, if xi∗k = 0, ∀k = 1, 2, . . . , di (8)
Where ek is the k-th unit vector, hence eTkA
ij denotes is the k−th row in the payoff matrix associated
to players (i, j). Lastly xi∗k is the k-th entry in the strategy vector of player i.
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Proof. The proof is similar to the proof for 3. To show 7 assume by contradiction that ∃i, k, k′ such
that:
xi∗k > 0, x
i∗
k′ > 0 and e
T
k
∑
[i,j]∈E
Aijxj∗ > eTk′
∑
[i,j]∈E
Aijxj∗
player i is incentivized to change the strategy to xi∗∗ by transferring the probability associated to
strategy k′ to strategy k, (i.e. xi∗∗k = x
i∗
k + x
i∗
k′ and x
i∗∗
k′ = 0 ). To show 8, assume by contradiction
that ∃i, k, k′ such that:
xi∗k = 0, x
i∗
k′ > 0 and e
T
k
∑
[i,j]∈E
Aijxj∗ > eTk′
∑
[i,j]∈E
Aijxj∗
player i is incentivized to change the strategy to xi∗∗ by swapping the probability associated to
strategy k′ to strategy k, (i.e. xi∗∗k = x
i∗
k′ and x
i∗∗
k′ = 0 ).
Note that it is not necessary for an arbitrary game from the maximimal uncertainty game to be
zero-sum as in Definition 1. This means that an optimal strategy of a nominal zero-sum polymatrix
game remains optimal in an ex-post sense for the maximal uncertainty set defined above even when
the zero-sum condition is violated. Lemma 3 and 4 define a set of restrictions on payoffs that preserve
the best-response property of a tuple of strategies.
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